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My writing was about you, indeed I was only confiding my troubles to a book because I 
could not confide in you. It was a deliberately extended farewell to you; but although you 
impelled me to write, my writing took the course I set for it. 
—Franz Kafka, Letter to My Father 
 
 
For Jeff Kesterson, 1955-2015 
 
 
In a 1991 lecture given at the University of California at Berkeley, J.M. Coetzee gives 
“Homage” to “some of the writers without whom [he] would, in a certain sense, not 
exist”—Flaubert, Joyce, Beckett, Faulkner, Eliot, Rilke, and Pound, to name a few—
acknowledging a “literary paternity” from which he descends (“Homage” 5).  
This homage, which titularly and stylistically suggests some reverence for the 
father figure(s) mentioned, is slightly at odds when set against the often less than 
flattering depictions of fathers across Coetzee’s works: in Dusklands, a father attempts 
infanticide; In the Heart of the Country’s Magda fantasizes about killing, or actually kills 
(it is uncertain), her authoritative, oppressive father with an axe; Disgrace’s David Lurie 
is disconnected from his daughter, and fails to protect her from home invasion and rape; 
Diary of a Bad Year’s “JC” is an aging man who wishes another man, Johann Sebastian 
Bach, were his father.  
 And then there is the father in Summertime and its related textual predecessors, 
genealogically relative-texts described as fictional memoirs or fictional autobiographies: 
Boyhood is the first of these, Youth the second. The final words of Summertime, 
identified as words gathered from the deceased John Coetzee’s notebooks, titled 
“Undated Fragments,” present an ultimatum.1 John’s aging, ailing father requires more 
intimate care, care that John does not necessarily wish to provide:  
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It used to be that he, John, had too little employment. Now that is about to 
change. Now he will have as much employment as he can handle, as much 
and more. He is going to have to abandon some of his personal projects 
and be a nurse. Alternatively, if he will not be a nurse, he must announce 
to his father: I cannot face the prospect of ministering to you day and 
night. I am going to abandon you. Goodbye. One or the other: there is no 
third way. (265-6) 
This culminative point constructs a binary opposition, explicitly declaring no alternative 
possibilities: abandon the father to pursue a life of writing, or abandon writing to nurse 
the dying father. This is the point that, for David Attwell, signals the “end of John’s being 
the child” (153). For Attwell, this moment, heralding the coming death of John’s father, 
is not so crucial to the story as John’s maturation, which Attwell insists is a theme 
eminently central to the ficto-auto-biographical triptych, a trilogy that concerns itself with 
“the emergence of the writer” (154).  
 And yet, while a writer’s emergence is no doubt present in the works, the father is 
absolutely crucial to the work, like fathers always are to their sons: the father is 
instrumental—not secondary—to the process whereby a writer might come to find his 
(own) feet. Thus, the opposition central to Summertime, a central opposition flirting along 
the text’s edges (to abandon or to nurse the father[s]), is neither a simple nor a 
straightforward matter of genealogy. Summertime, and perhaps Coetzee’s writings at 
large, perform a desire to turn toward and away from one’s own lineage—a kind of 
simultaneously centripetal and centrifugal movement, a literary performance versed in 
vicissitudes of truth and fiction inherent to autobiography. This somersault is a playful 
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search for, and perhaps discovery of, a third position, a search common to Coetzee’s 
texts. In this case the search is for a position that neither abandons nor nurses a father, 
lineage, paternity, or history, but that rather pursues another point both interior and 
exterior to the others, a point or state that is at once an abandonment of, and a kind of 
nursing of, a point that speaks to the heart of the work of writing itself.  
The metaphor of the father as an author and the text as the author’s child is 
inescapable, echoed here by Edward Said:  
The ground of literature is the text, just as its father—the mixed metaphor 
is inescapable, and encouraged by every writer who ever wrote—is the 
author. This is the very citadel of literary orthodoxy. Only a great writer 
will challenge that fortress of certainty. He will see that a father is himself 
a son; he will also see that his own work must be protected not only from 
writers who will come after it, but also from the powerful authors that 
precede him, who remind him by the strength of their prior authority and 
his filial secondariness. (“The Poet as Oedipus”)  
The father is first a figure that represents and possesses authority, and commonly, 
historically, one that represents and possesses an ultimate or omnipotent authority 
(theological allusions abound). The father is the head of the household, the breadwinner, 
the leader; the father is the founder, the first. The father is the one to whom his 
descendants look up (for better or worse) and is the one from whom the children take 
their surnames.  
 The authoritative father has typically been the force against which the son resists, 
the rule that the son defies. A child might wish to abandon his father to escape the power 
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and reach of paternal authority, simultaneously a source of limitation and a source of 
denial—potentially a denial of life, or of independent life. Eugene Dawn from Dusklands, 
working under the authority of the US government and, more immediately, his boss 
named Coetzee, is tasked to revise his essay detailing the procedures and effects of 
certain psychological warfare operations performed on the Việt Cộng during the Vietnam 
War. In his report, Dawn describes the “voice of the father” as one that “utters itself 
appropriately out of the sky,” first in the form of bombs from B-52s, whose devastating 
effects can easily translate, he suggests, to the vocal medium of “radio waves” 
(Dusklands 21). He concludes, or perhaps justifies the use of this voice, by stating bluntly 
that the father is itself “authority, infallibility, ubiquity. He does not persuade, he 
commands” (21). Magda also confirms the oppressive, suffocating, limiting power of the 
father’s voice, for it is the father’s mouth that “echoes and echoes” an “eternal NO” 
(Heart 16). 
 John’s father, at the end of Summertime, seems to say to John this “eternal NO” 
by way of the burden he has been, and has—at the end—become to John. In his ailment, 
and through his need for a nurse, he says “NO” to John’s writerly ambitions, at least at 
first glance; he says “NO” to a son who wants to at last break away from the father’s 
weighted presence, which John tries to escape at least once by looking into purchasing a 
house for his father to live, alone, in Merweville—a house which John perhaps attempts 
to convince himself will be “‘better than an old-age home’” even though it is located in a 
town where, according to Margot (through Vincent) “‘no one wants to live,’” perhaps 
making the house quite like living in an old-age home after all (107). 
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 Although John’s relationship with his father appears to lie on the edges of 
Summertime (in large part because of the textual positioning of some of the more intimate 
engagements between the two as outer framing edges to the core interviews conducted by 
biographer Mr Vincent) this filial relationship nevertheless becomes a central thread in 
the text, and is instrumental—not secondary—to the emergence of John as a writer. 
Already this is established via the burden expressed by the text’s final words, words I 
have already quoted: the “pivotal” moment of the text, perhaps. It follows then that if one 
wanted to understand, or at least see a way in which a writer emerges, specifically here 
Coetzee via John, one should further consider what it is about this relationship that 
affects the subject: what might impel him—the writer—to write (after all, such 
considerations—of the origins of the artist, of his inspiration, of his motives, and so on, 
are so often goals of critics, if not at least for how such consideration might lead to some 
kind of new “revelation” of the text the critic examines).  
 This consideration must be of Coetzee via John and must thus be an examination 
of both John and Coetzee: due in no small part to the autobiographical-function of 
Coetzee’s texts, but also of all writing in general. This is despite a call for departure from 
critical focus on a text’s author espoused by Roland Barthes in “The Death of the 
Author,” wherein an author is detached from his or her text. Barthes says that “Writing is 
that neutral, composite, oblique space where our subject slips away, the negative where 
all identity is lost, starting with the very identity of the body writing”; he adds that the 
moment when “this disconnection occurs” and “the voice loses its origin” is the moment 
that “the author enters into his own death” and “writing begins” (142). Mikhail Bakhtin is 
also in pursuit of the author, suggesting that “The author (as creator of the novelistic 
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whole) cannot be found at any of the novel's language levels: he is to be found at the 
center of organization where all levels intersect,” or, one might say, the author is found at 
the center of the text (48-9). Such a location certainly conflicts with the disappearance of 
the author described by Barthes. In response, Jacques Derrida undoes this logic in 
showing how, notably, “The center is at the center of the totality, and yet, since the center 
does not belong to the totality (is not part of the totality), the totality has its center 
elsewhere. The center is not the center,” (Writing and Difference 279). This response, a 
kind of third position to Barthes and Bahktin, suggests that, paradoxically, the author is 
and is not found at the center of converging voices present in a text.  
Summertime very clearly presents its audience with an analogously paradoxical 
situation. Its fictional author, John Coetzee, is, in the present time of the work, ostensibly 
dead, biologically dead for the purposes of the fiction, and whose voice is heard speaking 
from journal scraps framing the spatially central matter of interviews. These interviews, 
which make up the bulk of Summertime, are conducted and collected by biographer 
Vincent—who is also one of the “internal author-authorit[ies]” of Summertime, to borrow 
Brian Macaskill’s words (21). Vincent’s stated goal in conducting and collecting these 
interviews is to craft a biography of the presently-dead John, with specific focus on the 
years in which he was “still finding his feet as a writer” (225). He thus speaks with five 
individuals—Julia, Margot, Adriana, Martin, and Sophie—all who, unlike himself, have 
known John “in the flesh” (34); despite his presence and status as an internal author-
authority in Summertime, Vincent depends upon the authenticity of the words of others: 
he places a kind of trust in the authority of his sources—like a son might relate to a 
father. 
7 
 
Each interviewee—supposedly an author of her or his (mostly her) own story—
details select events from her time with John, and as a result, each voice sounds a distinct 
and unique representation of John. Summertime's polyphonic structure further bifurcates 
when Vincent's voice mingles with, and in some cases affects or edits, others' voices. A 
reading of Julia's portion of the novel reveals at the first a formatting strategy to 
distinguish Julia's voice from Vincent's, as here the interviewee's voice is left untouched 
while the interviewer's voice is italicized. In the following section, Margot's, the format 
switches and, notably, the politics of the interview itself shift. Where the prior 
conversation between Julia and Vincent is an interview occurring or in process, Vincent 
follows up with Margot concerning an interview that has already occurred: the audience 
is not shown the initial interview. Vincent opens their discussion by telling Margot how 
he “did something fairly radical. [He] cut out [his] prompts and questions and fixed up 
the prose to read as an uninterrupted narrative spoken in [Margot's] voice,” to which 
Margot expresses qualms, saying—in italics—“When I spoke to you, I was under the 
impression you were simply going to transcribe our interview and leave it at that. I had 
no idea you were going to rewrite it completely”; Vincent retorts by saying “That's not 
entirely fair. I have not rewritten it, I have simply recast it as a narrative” (87, 91). On 
one level, an authorial tension between interviewer, who has edited a supposedly true 
story, and interviewee, who told this story, emerges. One questions who owns the 
original spoken words, and thus who speaks the truth of events discussed. In “[fixing] up 
[Margot's] prose,” Vincent adds his own voice and language to Margot's, and Vincent's 
voice and language are never identical in meaning or intention to Margot's. The result of 
this polyphonic interpretation of another voice is an obfuscation: whatever intentions 
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Margot might have had in saying what she said in the particular way with the particular 
language she used blurs and gets lost when Vincent merges his voice with hers, when he 
“recast[s] it as a narrative.” 
Proposing for a moment that John is at the center of Summertime—as Attwell 
suggests (see above)—or that every voice in some way revolves around or attempts to tell 
his story—the story of his shape or character, and the story of how he emerges as a 
writer—the described bifurcation of voices uncovers a tremendous distancing from that 
center: a polyphonic narrative strategy that moves centripetally. If John is at the center, 
an interesting possibility emerges: John is both related and unrelated to Coetzee, the 
novel's author, and as such reveals the potentiality for the novel to be an autobiography; 
yet, if the polyphonic play works to distance the text from John, the autobiographical 
aims of the novel succumb to failure. A parallel that confirms or contributes to this failure 
is the confused labelling of Summertime: US editions subtitle it as “fiction,” while UK 
and commonwealth editions opt not to include a subtitle at all or use the subtitle “Scenes 
from Provincial Life,” a nod to the title of Gustave Flaubert’s Madame Bovary: Mœurs 
de province. 
In Doubling the Point, a collection of essays composed by Coetzee and interviews 
conducted by Attwell, Attwell emphasizes that “autobiography is secondary to fiction” 
(3). Attwell insists that this is the case despite Coetzee’s repeated insistence that “all 
writing is autobiographical” (17, 391).2 Coetzee continues to describe “autobiography as 
a biographical activity” where “Biography is a kind of storytelling in which you select 
material from a lived past and fashion it into a narrative that leads into a living present in 
a more or less seamless way. The premise of biography is continuity between past and 
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present” (391). If Coetzee's definition of biography is to be trusted—alongside his 
declaration of the nature of autobiography with regard to biographical activity—there 
evolves a difficulty in distinguishing between biographical modes: autobiography is itself 
a form of storytelling; the only difference between autobiography and biography, at first, 
is that the potential subject of an autobiographical story is the self-writing, rather than the 
other under examination, as is the case in biography. Coetzee explains in greater detail 
how these modes differ, saying that: 
What sets autobiography apart from other biography is, on the one hand, 
that the writer has privileged access to information and, on the other, that 
because tracing the line from past to present is such a self-interested 
enterprise (self-interested in every sense), selective vision, even a degree 
of blindness, becomes inevitable—blindness to what may be obvious to 
any passing observer. (DP 391) 
Autobiography differs from biography precisely in how it is a genre that is 
granted access to more intimate knowledge of its subject, by virtue of its subject also 
being its author. Consequently, in accessing this knowledge, one inevitably finds oneself 
solipsistically involved in a centrifugal operation functioning in seclusion from that 
which lies outside the borders of the self, and therein Coetzee's blindness reveals itself. 
On the other hand, it appears impossible for a biographer to uncover true knowledge of 
the biographical subject, the kind of knowledge truly available to the autobiographical 
subject, as biography as a genre possesses a trait that disconnects the author from the 
subject of the writing. And yet, autobiography is not afforded the same kind of distance 
present in biographical writing. Because both genres have unique boundaries preventing a 
10 
 
reader or writer from arriving at absolute truth of the writing subject, some medium 
between the two modes of discourse would be necessary to counteract those troublesome 
traits of distance and closeness, if the most authentic, true image of the subject is sought.  
If autobiography is resigned to shadows, then Coetzee's repeated statement that 
“All autobiography is storytelling, all writing is autobiography” becomes one of concern 
as all textual production is complicit with its author, but is also without center—that is, 
all writing lacks a singular, absolute truth, that can be traced back to a source, such as its 
author, in a reliable way. Derrida's critique of logocentrism is another way of envisioning 
this paradox between the autobiographical element of writing and the absence of a more 
grounded and absolute truth inherent to writing. Moreover, if one examines the troubled 
center delineated in Derrida's discourse, one finds that the center, located inside and 
outside the structure to which it pertains, is much like the structure of both autobiography 
and biography insofar as these mediums seek a center: the center, both inside and outside 
of the discourse, is at once always available and unavailable to the external and internal 
observer.  
Coetzee disrupts the auto-biographical paradox with his notion of autrebiography, 
a kind of alternative auto-biographical form interested in acknowledging the complicity 
between autobiography and biography while remaining in touch with the differences in 
their traits. The word autrebiography is prefixed with the French word autre, meaning 
“other”; when fixed to the word biography, it represents a wordplay that points towards a 
mode of writing that does not so obviously and outright seek knowledge of the writer, as 
autobiography does. At the same time, the “other” prefixation implies a distance from the 
subject of writing that is other than that position held by the biographer, who views the 
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subject of writing from a kind of mock-scientific position (and it is a mock position 
because it announces itself as one of objectivity while nevertheless succumbing to 
subjective pitfalls that are understandably hard to avoid, such as possible interjections of 
personal perspectives). Rather, this “otherbiography” seeks knowledge of a subject that 
looks alongside an interior, privileged autobiographical position and an exterior 
biographical position. Autrebiography merges the distinct constitutive elements of 
autobiography and biography to overcome the previously described limitations of each 
discursive mode that largely prevent a writer from arriving at absolute, infallible truths of 
whatever subject is at hand. In this way, autrebiography enacts a politics of alterity, or 
Otherness, in writing the self; the author writes with simultaneous access to the visible 
and the invisible and becomes a “secretary of the invisible” as another of Coetzee’s semi-
fictional authors—Elizabeth Costello—calls herself (199).  
All of Coetzee’s writing is invested in the autobiographical, and his more 
explicitly generic ficto-auto-biographies—Boyhood, Youth, and Summertime—embrace 
the autrebiographical mode of writing. The autrebiograpahical stylistic maneuver 
resembles if not enacts a third position between the death of the author and the pursuit of 
authorial power and intent. Following the autrebiographical as a third position to the 
oppositional stances of autobiographical and biographical—one that reimagines the 
authority of the author as well as reimagines who (or what) the subject of the writing is—
unfolds as a third position that echoes one alongside or between those of nursing or 
abandoning the father figure. The father, again following rampant genealogical metaphor, 
is the author-authority of a text; the father is the writer, the text a kind of son. And the 
father as the author-authority over a text must abandon himself in writing a text, as the 
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work of writing demands. He must forgo the central position of a text. Despite that 
essential abandonment, the author-authority figure remains as a kind of spectral figure, 
instrumental in the work of writing by virtue of his author-authority.  
Early in Summertime’s interviews, Vincent asks Julia, “Did John love his father, 
do you think,” to which she replies (nodding to Freud) that “Boys hate their fathers and 
want to supplant them in their mothers’ affections,” and that, no, John “did not love his 
father” and that he “was not built for love,” adding, though, that John “did feel guilty 
about his father. He felt guilty and therefore behaved dutifully. With certain lapses,” all 
before returning to a description of her own father (48).3 Previously, in Boyhood, the 
father—the same father depicted in Summertime—occupies a position that is obscure to 
the boy: 
He has never worked out the position of his father in the household. In 
fact, it is not obvious to him by what right his father is there at all. In a 
normal household, he is prepared to accept, the father stands at the head: 
the house belongs to him, the wife and children live under his sway. But in 
their own case, and in the households of his mother’s two sisters as well, it 
is the mother and children who make up the core, while the husband is no 
more than an appendage, a contributor to the economy as a paying lodger 
might be. (12) 
Throughout the three ficto-auto-biographical texts, the father figure is not obviously a 
core body, or the head, but always just an appendage—most obviously in Summertime, 
where the father, though he appears throughout, most clearly and most powerfully 
appears only in the framing fragments, where John’s notebooks address him more closely 
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than the vacillating voices do in the textual body. Perhaps this is the source of Attwell’s 
location of the father as secondary to the emergence of John (and Coetzee) as a writer. 
But again, in Summertime the father figure is precisely that which is displayed as being 
instrumental, and thus critical, to the maturation and, crucially, the development of John 
(and Coetzee) as a writer. Though the father figure might speak and reside on the outer 
edges of the work, framing the textual body, he is integral to that which he frames; and, 
as a frame, he warps and bends the subject matter—like a father shapes his son, 
regardless (or precisely because) of how much or how little he is present. And while this 
father figure as frame warps and bends the subject matter, the subject in turn erects a kind 
of resistance against his influence. Such a struggle to “supplant” the father (recalling 
Julia) repeats throughout Coetzee’s works, but is described quite eloquently by the boy, 
or John, of Boyhood, who “has had a sense of himself as prince of the house” for as long 
as he can remember, but is nonetheless anxious because “he knows a child is not meant to 
rule the roost” (12). Ultimately, the boy, who explicitly describes dislike for his father, 
would rather not have one at all:  
Even before he knew his father, that is to say, before his father returned 
from the war, he had decided he was not going to like him. In a sense, 
therefore, the dislike is an abstract one: he does not want to have a father, 
or at least does not want a father who stays in the same house. (43) 
These feelings toward the father are similar to those in Diary of a Bad Year, where JC, 
another internal author-authority who bears initials that again resemble those of the text’s 
outer author-authority Coetzee, wishes that he could elect his own father:  
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Who is Johann Sebastian Bach to me? In naming him, do I name the father 
I would elect if, from all the living and the dead, one were allowed to elect 
one’s father? Do I in this sense choose him as my spiritual father? And 
what is it that I want to make up for by bringing at last a first, faint smile 
to his lips? For having been, in my time, such a bad son? (222) 
All these passages, from Dusklands through Summertime and Diary, point toward a 
desire to “disown” one’s “real parents” and claim for the self “a much finer-sounding 
lineage,” as Coetzee discusses in his “Homage” (5). Yet still, despite so many struggles 
against the father in Coetzee’s texts, the father remains; though it “is sometimes possible 
to change one’s name” as Coetzee does so often, following that autobiographical element 
(the Coetzees in Dusklands, the John Coetzee of Summertime, JC in Diary and, in a 
different way, the Elizabeth Costello of Elizabeth Costello). It is never possible, as 
Macaskill writes, to “elect one’s father” (34): 
Instead, one has to learn to submit or to accommodate oneself to the father 
one actually has; which also means, in the formulation Jacques Lacan so 
elegantly derives, one has to accommodate oneself to language and its 
silences, the Law of the Father. 
Or: just to love him, it. (34) 
Because, in part, and again, one depends upon the father, one would not be without one’s 
father. 
Nevertheless, the struggle persists. Discord between fathers and sons is a common 
trope, in Coetzee’s texts (and elsewhere); to borrow Coetzee’s words, discord between 
fathers and sons is a “banal” idea (“Homage” 7). But it persists, and that much is evident, 
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and invites attention. Beyond the banality of the trope is once more a metaphorical 
extension of fathers and sons, here extending to a relationship between authors of texts 
and authors that precede them—in other words, a literary genealogy.  
Recalling Said above, a literary genealogy goes hand-in-hand with the trope of a 
son struggling against his father’s influence. This is noticed in many, by many authors; 
compelling evinced here by Julia Kristeva in her Desire and Language: A Semiotic 
Approach to Literature and Art. In a passage responding to Bakhtin, a literary father of 
her own, she describes and coins the term intertextuality:  
By introducing the status of the word as a minimal structural unit, Bakhtin 
situates the text within history and society, which are then seen as texts 
read by the writer, and into which he inserts himself by rewriting them [...] 
any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption 
and transformation of another. The notion of intertextuality replaces that 
of intersubjectivity, and poetic language is read as at least double. (65-6)  
Here, the writer is always found within some historical and social environment, existing 
as part of certain historical and social structures. As a part of these structures, the writer, 
having written, introduces bits and pieces of herself into those structures, both by way of 
her work’s ideas (banal as they might be) and by way of her work’s stylistic uniqueness. 
The writer’s interaction with a history and society foregrounds the autobiographical 
element of writing, as it is her unique presence, mixing into those structures, that 
becomes a part of a large body of works (a “canon”) that will be read (one hopes) by 
readers. These readers—all readers—are also in some ways writers themselves, during 
the work of reading, even if they are not literally engaging in the work or act of writing.  
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The reader is always, in a word, re-imagining the contents of the work, and it can be said 
then that the reader is writing the work, perhaps doubly, into existence—doubly because 
the work exists as itself, to itself, by itself, and for itself as a work, prior to and 
simultaneously as the reading of the work.  
 Intertextuality depends upon bricolage and the bricoleur, the latter who is 
someone that uses: 
the instruments he finds at his disposition around him, those which are 
already there, which had not been especially conceived with an eye to the 
operation for which they are to be used and to which one tries by trial and 
error to adapt them, not hesitating to change them whenever it appears 
necessary, or to try several of them at once, even if their form and their 
origin are heterogeneous. (Derrida, Writing and Difference 285) 
The bricoleur is a “handyman,” one who assembles his works with what is at hand, like a 
bricklayer might assemble a house (one notices the sonorous similarities between the 
French bricoleur and the English bricklayer). Perhaps these items are allusions or 
references, perhaps they are more direct bits such as quotations; perhaps the extent of 
assembly ends at an epigraph, or extends to a kind of rewriting, like Joyce’s Ulysses of 
Odysseus. All discourse is, for Derrida, bricolage, if its structure relies upon “the text of a 
heritage which is more or less coherent or ruined” (285). It seems clear that all discourse 
relies on some heritage, insofar as all discourse responds to something, and as all 
discourse depends on language, which has, or is always linked to, a heritage. From this 
relationship, a potential anxiety haunts a writer, as described by Harold Bloom in his 
volumes on the subject. This “anxiety of influence,” as he calls it, depends upon a 
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position that sees a literary history—a canon, or “literature” itself—as indistinguishable 
from artistic influence, since such a history is built by artists that “misread” each other 
(The Anxiety of Influence 5). This anxiety arises from an “indebtedness” a writer has to 
his lineage, one that includes a sense of “living up to” one’s name, and thereby one’s 
history; one is indebted to one’s father not only because the father has granted the child 
life, but also because the child carries some trace of his father, if it is a surname or some 
other trait,4 and by such a connection son has some power, some authority with which to 
shape and direct the course of an identity attached to that name. Derrida, speaking On the 
Name, considers the name as itself not the thing that it names. It is, however, a kind of 
assignment, or even an alliance: one’s surname assigns him and allies him with a lineage, 
traditionally a paternity. With this name comes at once a history of all those who share 
the name, and with this history a kind of weight or perceived obligation—one must “live 
up to the name.” A name in this sense then is a kind of burden, insofar as one is pressured 
to appeal to and appease that name which looms over them (On the Name 84-85). A 
name, which so often is given by the father, is itself a kind of father; and fathers can be 
disappointed by their sons.  
Sons are beholden to their fathers. Sons bear the mark of their fathers, by name or 
by a participation in a genetic scheme. The work of writing, Summertime or any other, 
bears marks not only of the more external author-authority, the one explicitly named as 
responsible for writing the text, but also the marks of all those in a literary paternity that 
author responds to. And though the author might choose, as Coetzee suggests in his 
“Homage,” which authors to respond to—apparently electing his own father(s)—the 
genealogy inherent to a word unit, the fact that a word unit is itself tied to a genealogy, 
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and largely literature’s body itself as a kind of ancestral corpus with its own vast family 
tree, make it impossible even at the most microscopic level to fully break away from 
one’s lineage. It makes it impossible to, with absolute authority, elect one’s father.  
So. if it is the case that sons are beholden to their fathers, and if, as Walter 
Benjamin (corroborating Derrida’s sense that all discourse is bricolage) says that 
“storytelling is always the art of repeating stories,” then again, the question surfaces: can 
anything new be said (91).5  
This is a perspective to discourage prospective storytellers of any kind: that there 
can be no “new” stories, and what follows from that nihilism is that there is nothing left 
to be said. This seems to be the great burden of the writer, the great anxiety he faces, and 
it is this burden and anxiety against which Summertime struggles, a burden and anxiety 
beneath father figures, that asks: how can one write something anew, forge their own 
literary identity in the face of such a heavy history as a literary canon, if one is nursing 
one’s literary fathers, reinforced by such phenomena as intertextuality and bricolage? 
How can one write something new, if one does not abandon one’s history? 
 Total abandonment is impossible. It seems as if the heaviest anxiety rests in the 
looming presence of literature itself. But not everything has been said. What positions 
itself against existential anxieties about writing, and resists the pull of banality coupled 
with the work of writing, is the notion of play, which Derrida describes below: 
Play is the disruption of presence. The presence of an element is always a 
signifying and substitutive reference inscribed in a system of differences 
and the movement of a chain. Play is always play of absence and presence, 
but if it is to be thought radically, play must be conceived of before the 
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alternative of presence of absence. Being must be conceived as presence 
or absence on the basis of the possibility of play and not the other way 
around. (292) 
Play disrupts the “presence,” the unavoidable, inescapable chain or link integral to 
language. If all discourse is bricolage and is always involved in a history, in a lineal 
structure, or in the presence of concepts borrowed from other texts, then play is what 
resists total and absolute repetition of texts and ideas. Play, in this sense, can be taken as 
referring less to what is said or written, and more to how it is said or written. Play is 
style; play is the arrangement of words, sentences, paragraphs, and so forth; play is 
performance. 
Famously, on style and what he saw as the “future of Art,” Flaubert, who wanted 
to write “a book about nothing” that would be “dependent on nothing external” and that 
“would be held together by the internal strength of its style, just as the earth, suspended in 
the void, depends on nothing external for its support,” a book “which would have almost 
no subject, or at least in which the subject would be almost invisible,” writes: 
Form, in becoming more skillful, becomes attenuated; it leaves behind all 
liturgy, rule, measure; the epic is discarded in favor of the novel, verse in 
favor of prose; there is no longer any orthodoxy, and form is as free as the 
will of its creator. This progressive shedding of the burden of tradition can 
be observed everywhere: governments have gone through similar 
evolution, from oriental despotisms to the socialisms of the future. It is for 
this reason that there are no noble subjects or ignoble subjects; from the 
standpoint of pure Art one might almost establish the axiom that there is 
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no such thing as subject—style in itself being an absolute manner of 
seeing things. (154) 
This “progressive shedding of the burden of tradition” that is visible everywhere for 
Flaubert might first seem to match up with the note on which Summertime ends, that 
progress (of the writer, of writing) must involve an abandonment of tradition, a turning 
away from one’s history, one’s lineage, must involve disowning one’s father(s). At turns, 
Coetzee’s works, their ideas, resemble such a shedding. There is Duskland’s fictional 
account of Jacobus Coetzee’s expedition, which nods to Flaubert as a literary father via 
an epigraph saying: “What is important is the philosophy of history,” and which by 
fictional nature turns away from the “truth” to forge ahead with its own narrative. Then 
there is Summertime’s various maneuvers with truths, that often amount to anachronisms, 
including the date of John’s first journal scrap (which constitutes the beginning proper of 
Summertime): a date of “22 August 1972.” This date is immediately followed by the 
sentence “IN YESTERDAY’S Sunday Times, a report from Francistown in Botswana” 
(3). The twenty-second of August 1972 announced by the journal entry was a Tuesday, 
and not a Monday—making the “YESTERDAY” announced here a Monday, a day in 
which the “Sunday Times” was not and could not have been published. Another of the 
text’s many anachronisms is how John lives on Tokai Road, just as his real-life 
counterpart Coetzee, only the latter lives with his wife and two children, while the 
account of Summertime places the former there alone with his father (Kannemeyer 607). 
Both of those anachronistic stylistic moves subvert biographical traditions, but they also 
point once more to a turning away from history—a turning away from the authority of the 
calendar, as evinced by the erroneous dating on the work’s first page, and a turning away 
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from one’s own lived past, as evinced by the alteration (or revision) of Coetzee’s and his 
father’s early 1970s living arrangements. Responding to Flaubert, Coetzee’s works fulfill 
not only the “shedding of the burden of tradition” at large, but also a breaking of 
orthodoxy and form.  
Nearing the end of his “Homage,” Coetzee echoes Flaubert’s words, again like a 
son might echo a father, suggesting that what one learns from a literary paternity is “not a 
body of ideas but a certain style, hard durable: a style that is also an approach to the 
world and to experience, political experience included” (“Homage” 7). And while these 
ideas are “certainly important,” as Coetzee acknowledges, “the fact is, the ideas that 
operate in novels and poems, once they are unpicked from their context and laid out on 
the laboratory table”—such as they so often are in critical essays—“usually turn out to be 
uncomplicated, even banal” (“Homage” 7). On the other hand, a work’s style has the 
potential to be stronger, and has the potential to be more compelling than the banal ideas 
that operate in and populate texts. Style: 
as it soaks in, becomes part of the personality, part of the self. To put it 
another way: in the process of responding to the writers one intuitively 
chooses to respond to, one makes oneself into the person whom in the 
most intractable but also perhaps the most deeply ethical sense one wants 
to be. (“Homage” 7) 
Thus, to circle back once more to the metaphor at the heart of this essay, the son, in his 
being as a kind of response to his father, takes some bit of his father’s identity—some bit 
of his style—consciously or unconsciously, and incorporates it into the construction of 
his own self, just like the bricoleur. This way of self-creation is not oppressed by the 
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over-bearing father, and the son’s identity does not become entirely that of his fathers’. 
Rather, it is alongside the father that the son moves on. Though the father impels the son, 
as Kafka—a father to this essay—describes in a letter to his father, the son still takes a 
course of his own (130). The son nurses the father and abandons the father, yet neither of 
these courses of action are final, and each will repeat, and each can occur simultaneously, 
in centripetal and centrifugal motion: a turning toward and away from one’s own history.  
 At one point John, who resolved “for ever [to] hate and despise Italian opera,” 
because that is what his father loved, “despise[d] it simply because his father loved it” 
and would not admit outside of his journals that there was the possibility that he would 
further resolve to “hate and despise anything in the world that his father loved,” scours a 
deep score into one of his father’s Tebaldi records, so that his own music—Bach—can 
reign supreme (248-9). Despite the callousness of Summertime’s conclusion, there 
remains—in italics, and thus partially in emphasis alongside the stylistic effect of 
indicating a voice change—a feeling of remorse, a grasping towards the father, which 
follows a replacement of the Tebaldi record, to which his father does not respond:  
He wanted his father’s breast to swell with that old joy; if only for an hour, 
he wanted him to relive that lost youth, forget his present crushed and 
humiliated existence. Above all he wanted his father to forgive him. 
Forgive me! he wanted to say to his father. Forgive you? Heavens, what is 
there to forgive? he wanted to hear his father reply. Upon which, if he 
could summon up the courage, he would at last make full confession: 
Forgive me for deliberately and with malice aforethought scratching your 
Tebaldi record. And for more besides, so much more that the recital would 
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take all day. For countless acts of meanness. For the meanness of heart in 
which those acts originated. In sum, for all I have done since the day I was 
born, and with such success, to make your life a misery. (250) 
 
The gap between father and son, the fact that John “finds it hard to detect what his father 
cares about,” a gap that if bridged, or overcome, could “solve the mystery of what in the 
world his father,” any father, “wants,” so that one could “perhaps be a better son,” all 
coupled with a simultaneous turning away from and towards history, at large and of one’s 
self, further drives a desire not to abandon the father (247). Instead of absolute 
abandonment in favor of nursing the idea of the father figure—one’s literary or biological 
paternity—one can opt for a third position, as Summertime and largely Coetzee’s works 
suggest. A third position: to realize that the father is in the son, the son is in the father, 
and that the progression of great writing, and of a great writer, involves an observation of 
how nursing and abandoning—turning towards and away from—creates writing. 
* * * 
In 2015, following an exhausting struggle with the after-effects of type II diabetes, my 
(biological) father died. I was there (all writing is to some degree autobiographical), in 
hospice, holding him as he died. Looking back to that moment, I had various worries and 
wonders: anger at him doing this to himself, not caring for his body, letting himself 
deteriorate and having his body succumb to the disease at a relatively young age. I said: 
Why were you not there for me? Why did you abandon me? And beside these responses I 
felt a twisting sadness: he was gone—I would never hear from his mouth answers to 
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those questions and others that perhaps all sons ask of their fathers: Are you disappointed 
in me? Proud of me? Do you love me? Are you happy to be my father?   
At the same time, I asked myself: Why didn’t you visit him more often, knowing 
he was going to die? Have you been a bad son? Did he know that you loved him? Did 
you love him? Were you happy to have been his son? 
In several ways, this essay, now nearing the end of its course, has been an 
exploration of an inability, an instability, to hear the authoritative voice, to not hear the 
answers, true answers, inherent in the work of writing—the work of writing fiction, but 
also biography and autobiography—my own attempt at reconciling the unreconcilable.  
Hence, what I offer the reader instead of a conclusion, as a failure perhaps, the 
polyphonic echoes bouncing off Summertime, mixing there with those voices that circle 
around the dead John Coetzee, whose own voice circles around theirs, all to reveal no 
certain truth about each other or anything else. A failure to reveal—but a failure that is 
also a success. Such is the nature of the relationship, to extend and perhaps exhaust the 
dominant familial metaphor, between the writer and the reader. The reader, like a child 
searching for answers, from the parent (here, the father), but is left wanting. 
Are we thus directionless? 
Is it perhaps memory—and memories are stories—that provides some semblance 
of direction, some semblance of comfort?  
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Notes 
1 To avoid confusion, I will hereafter refer to the fictional author in Summertime as 
“John” or “John Coetzee,” and the actual author of the text as “Coetzee.” 
2 Attwell’s later work, J.M. Coetzee and the Life of Writing, finally seems to embrace the 
autobiographical elements of Coetzee’s writing.   
3 Shortly after this passage, Julia discloses to Vincent her raison d’être: she has become a 
therapist because she wants to “save people from being treated as [her] father was 
treated” in a sanatorium outside of Port Elizabeth. Perhaps it is guilt that she feels, 
because it is her brother who supplied the sanitorium with required funds to keep their 
father inside, and who “religiously visited” their father “every week” (49). For Julia, it 
was only her brother who “had taken on the burden” of their father’s care, and, “In the 
sole sense that matters,” she had “abandoned him” (49). Following once more the 
autobiographical, we hear language that resembles John’s: the word “abandon” and a 
sense of the father as being a “burden.”  
4 Genetically, the father is responsible for the son’s biological sex.  
5 It should be noted that we can take the “storytelling” in Benjamin to be applicable to 
various, if not all, genres of writing, as the self-contained, self-reliant, solitary reality of 
any writing is that it tells a story (this of course includes the so-called literary critics’ 
stories). 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
Works Cited 
Attwell, David. J.M. Coetzee and the Life of Writing: Face to Face with Time. Viking, 
2015. 
Bakhtin, Mikhail. The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays. Translated by Caryl Emerson 
and Michael Holquist. Edited by Michael Holquist. University of Texas Press, 
1981. 
Barthes, Roland. Image—Music—Text. Translated by Stephen Heath. Hill and Wang, 
1977. 
Benjamin, Walter. Illuminations: Essays and Reflections. Translated by Harry Zohn, 
1968. 
Bloom, Harold. The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry. 1973. Second Edition, 
Oxford University Press, 1997. 
---. A Map of Misreading. Oxford University Press, 1975. 
Coetzee, J.M. Boyhood: Scenes from Provincial Life. 1997. Penguin, 1998. 
---. Diary of a Bad Year. Penguin, 2008. 
---. Disgrace. Viking, 1999.  
---. Doubling the Point: Essays and Interviews. Edited by David Attwell. Harvard 
University Press, 1992. 
---. Dusklands. 1974. Penguin, 1996. 
---. Elizabeth Costello. Viking, 2003 
---. “Homage.” The Threepenny Review, No. 53, Spring 1993, pp. 5-7. JSTOR. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4384178. Essay originally given as a lecture at the 
University of California at Berkeley, November 12, 1991.  
27 
 
---. In the Heart of the Country. 1977. Penguin, 1982. 
---. Youth: Scenes From Provincial Life II. 2002. Penguin, 2003. 
---. Summertime. Viking, 2009. 
Derrida, Jacques. On the Name. Translated by David Wood, John P. Leavey, Jr., and Ian 
McLeod. Edited by Thomas Dutoit. Stanford University Press, 1995.  
---. Writing and Difference. Translated by Alan Bass. The University of Chicago Press, 
1978.  
Flaubert, Gustave. Madame Bovary: Mœurs de province. 1856. Nabu Press, 2010. 
---. The Letters of Gustave Flaubert, 1830-1857. Translated and Edited by Francis 
Steegmuller. Harvard University Press, 1980.  
Kafka, Franz. “Letter to My Father.” The Metamorphosis and Other Stories. Translated 
by John R. Williams. Wordsworth Editions, 2011. pp. 99-147. 
Kannemeyer, J.C. J.M. Coetzee: A Life in Writing. Translated by Michiel Heyns. Scribe, 
2012. 
Kristeva, Julia. Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art. 
Translated by Thomas Gora, Alice Jardine, and Leon S. Roudiez, Columbia 
University Press, 1980. 
Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English. Translated by Bruce Fink. 
Norton, 2007. 
Lejeune, Philippe. On Autobiography. Translated by Katherine Leary. University of 
Minnesota Press, 1989. 
28 
 
Macaskill, Brian. “Authority, the Newspaper, and Other Media, Including J.M. Coetzee’s 
Summertime.” Narrative, Vol. 21, No. 1, January 2013. Ohio State University, 
2013. pp. 20-45. 
Miller, J. Hillis. “The Critic as Host.” Deconstruction and Criticism, Continuum, 1979, 
pp. 217-254. 
Said, Edward W. “The Poet as Oedipus.” The New York Times. April 13, 1975. 
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/98/11/01/specials/bloom-
misreading.html?ncid=txtlnkusaolp00000618.  
